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NPT: A PILLAR OF GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE
Richard Butler AC
It is of basic importance to remember the negotiating history
of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) when policymakers
and academics analyze the Iran nuclear issue. At the core of that
history was a grand bargain between states with and without nuclear
weapons. Since then, states have taken a number of steps away from
that bargain, and some have even attempted to suggest there was no
grand bargain at the outset. Each of these steps has led to serious
problems.
KEY ELEMENTS OF THE NPT
The NPT has three components: preventing the proliferation
of nuclear weapons;1 nuclear disarmament;2 and protecting the right
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of all states to access nuclear science and technology.3 That was the
deal then, in all of its parts, and, for the overwhelming number of
states in the world today, it should remain the deal.
It also is essential to note a second political point about this
treaty. Almost from the beginning, the Treaty has been
misrepresented and mis-described, principally by the nuclear-weapon
states.4 I have sat in countless conferences with representatives from
such states, in which they have attempted to tell the world that the
Treaty is not about the three components listed above, but rather
about only one—preventing others from getting the bomb. Over and
over again, the nuclear-weapon states have sought to reinterpret NPT
to what they consider their own advantage.
There are many examples of this perspective. However, the
example that sticks in my recent memory, which is highly relevant to
the Iran issue, was when then-President of the United States, George
W. Bush, told the world that the reason Iran must not be allowed to
have nuclear weapons is, something to the effect of, because of the kind
of people they are. I won’t dignify this viewpoint by commenting on the
obviously racist, or, at the very least, culturally discriminatory aspect
of the statement, but I simply point out that this is not what the
Treaty says. What it states is that Treaty partners who do not have
nuclear weapons—referred to as the non-nuclear-weapon state
parties in the Treaty, of which Iran is one—should never get them.
This is because the NPT is designed to stop the spread of nuclear
weapons and to foster the elimination of those already in existence.
Whether or not the nuclear-weapon states like this, these two
objectives should be seen as inherently linked.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons art. III, opened for
signature July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT].
2 NPT, supra note 1, at art. VI.
3 NPT, supra note 1, at art. IV.
4 The “nuclear-weapon” states party to the NPT are the United States,
the Soviet Union (replaced by Russia), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, France, and the People’s Republic of China. See U.S.
DELEGATION TO THE 2010 NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY REVIEW
CONFERENCE,
ORIGINS
OF
THE
NPT
2
n.1
(2010),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/141503.pdf.
1

273

2013

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

2:2

There is another relevant anecdote I feel compelled to tell, as
it has bearing on a mindset that has dogged the NPT. A number of
years ago, I visited the head of the United States Arms Control
Disarmament Agency, that is, before a subsequent U.S.
Administration abolished it.5 Its head was Kenneth Adelman. I had
sought an appointment with Ken in my capacity as the Australian
Ambassador for Disarmament. I spoke with him about what we
hoped to achieve in arms control and his responsibilities. I
mentioned the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and safeguards
inspections including those that were to take place in the United
States. He became agitated, stopped me, and asked, “What did you
just say? Inspections of the U.S.?” I said, “Well, inspections of your
peaceful facilities, not your military facilities.” And he said, “You’re
telling me that we have to accept inspections on our facilities?” I said,
“Yes, I am.” He said, “No, no, those inspections are to be made of
the Russians. They’re the ones who get inspected, not us.” This
conversation illustrates the whole notion of good guys and bad guys.
It brings to mind the old saying one hears a lot in the disarmament
business: disarmament is a great idea, for the other guy.
I am not simply seeking to make fun of this outlook. I am
seeking to illustrate that, since the adoption of the NPT, there has
been a pervasive view in nuclear-weapon states circles, as reflected in
the stories I’ve told you, that the Treaty is essentially about
nonproliferation, not nuclear disarmament. This view is factually
incorrect.
Embedded in such thinking is also the view that there are
legitimately held nuclear weapons. At the present time, this view is
consistent with the terms of the Treaty. More specifically, there exists
the view that the legitimately held nuclear weapons are those held by
our side—by the good guys. All other weapons held or aspired to,
especially by adversaries or people of whom we do not approve, are
illegitimate.
There are several points to be made about this outlook. First,
it is factually incorrect. The NPT is directed to the elimination of all
See Press Release, The White House, Reinventing State, ACDA, USIA
and AID (Apr. 18, 1997), http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/aboutacd/gore.htm.
5
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nuclear weapons. Second, it is deeply damaging to the Treaty because
it has little or no relationship to the negotiating history of the Treaty.
Finally, if pursued further, this outlook will destroy the Treaty.
Let’s return to the first of these points. The Treaty envisages
a world without nuclear weapons. That some people seek to dispute
this historical fact borders on the mind-numbing. How else can one
logically interpret a document about nuclear weapons, which
establishes that those who do not have them must never get them
and that those who do have them must get rid of them? The NPT’s
objective is to create a world without nuclear weapons. That
objective is not served by the sort of flagrant, self-serving
misinterpretation of it described above.
1995 REVIEW CONFERENCE ON THE NPT
The NPT provides that after 25 years of its operation, a
conference of all parties will be held to determine its future:
“Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a
conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall
continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional
fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of
the Parties to the Treaty.”6 In 1995, the world gathered for the
Review and Extension Conference of the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty to decide whether or not the NPT should continue to exist.7
I led Australia’s delegation to that conference, and the final
deal, done at five minutes to midnight on the last night, was done
around my dining room table. I had been asked to convene a small
group of the principal actors and to put an agreement together.
Interestingly, that group of sixteen principals included the
representative from Iran. And the deal was done. It was agreed to
extend the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty indefinitely. So, the NPT
is to exist in perpetuity.

NPT, supra note 1, at art. X, § 2.
See 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: 17 April to 12 May 1995 – New York, U.N.,
http://www.un.org/depts/ddar/nptconf/162.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2013).
6
7
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That agreement should have been easy to reach. It was widely
recognized that the NPT gave expression to an utterly desirable norm
in civilized human life—that no one should have nuclear weapons. It
is the sole international agreement that aspires to this end.
Notwithstanding these values, indefinite extension was only
narrowly achieved. The non-nuclear-weapon states who are party to
the NPT were thoroughly sick of the fundamental inequality
embedded in the NPT.8 The Treaty attempts to bridge the gap
between nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states by
placing upon the former the obligation to progressively reduce their
weapons. However, it has been widely noted that the nuclear-weapon
states have implemented this obligation inadequately, if at all. In
response, the nuclear-weapon states argued that the Treaty had been
working well and that criticism of their tardiness in fulfilling their
nuclear disarmament obligations was unjustified.9
A group of states who were parties to the Treaty, including,
very significantly, Egypt, gave serious thought to both leaving the
NPT and refusing to agree to its extension.10 They were talked out of
it, mainly through agreement being given to an Egyptian proposal
that there be a future conference aimed at establishing the Middle
East as a zone free of nuclear weapons.11 The call for a nuclear free
zone in the Middle East, of course, brought to the forefront the
8 See Document on Substantive Issues Submitted by Indonesia on Behalf of the Group
of Non-Aligned and Other States, U.N. Doc. NPT/CONF. 1995/14 (Apr. 6, 1995),
http://www.un.org/depts/ddar/nptconf/211a.htm.
9 See Declaration dated 6 April 1995 by France, the Russian Federation, the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America in
connection with the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, U.N. Doc.
NPT/CONF.1995/20 (Apr. 19, 1995),
http://www.un.org/depts/ddar/nptconf/2102.htm.
10 See Carol Giacomo, U.S. pessimistic on Egypt support for nuclear pact,
REUTERS, Feb. 9, 1995.
11 Resolution on the Middle East, U.N. Doc. NPT/CONF. 1995/32 (Part I),
Annex (Apr. 19, 1995), http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/1995NPT/pdf/Resolution_MiddleEast.pdf. See Arab resolution to call on Israel to join NPT,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE ENGLISH WIRE, May 9, 1995; Resolution on the Middle East,
U.N. Doc. NPT/CONF. 1995/32 (Part I), Annex (Apr. 19, 1995),
http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/1995NPT/pdf/Resolution_MiddleEast.pdf.
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question of Israel’s nuclear weapons capability. To be blunt, Israel
would have to be at that conference table.12
The vision of a nuclear free zone in the Middle East has not
been implemented even though it was renewed in the 2010 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT). As a result, Egypt has essentially walked
out of the preparations for the 2015 review conference.13
IRAN AND THE NPT
Turning now specifically to Iran, under Article IV, Iran has
the right to nuclear science and technology.14 Specifically, as a nonnuclear-weapon state party to the NPT, Iran has the right to develop,
research, produce, and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.15
But, under Articles II and III of the Treaty and their derivatives, Iran
has two key obligations: (1) its activities in nuclear science and
technology must be conducted under full International Atomic
Energy Agency safeguards, and (2) it must not make a nuclear
explosive device. For some while now, the IAEA has reported to its
board and to the U.N. Security Council that Iran is not fulfilling the
first of these obligations.16 This has given rise to the suspicion that
Iran is pursuing the development of a nuclear explosive capability.
Neither the IAEA nor national intelligence agencies have yet
12 See Israel not likely to sign nuclear pact, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1995, available
at 1995 WLNR 300991; Israel to Sign Treaty, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 24,
1995, available at 1995 WLNR 2408249.
13 Stephanie Nebehay, U.S. regrets Egypt walk-out at nuclear talks, REUTERS,
Apr. 30, 2013, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/04/30/uk-nuclear-npt-egyptidUKBRE93T0KZ20130430.
14 NPT, supra note 1, at art. IV.
15 Id.
16 Int’l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Implementation of the NPT
Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Rep. of the Dir. Gen., IAEA Doc. GOV/2012/55 (Nov. 16, 2012),
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2012/gov2012-55.pdf;
IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security
Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Rep. of the Dir. Gen., IAEA Doc.
GOV/2013/27 (May 22, 2013),
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2013/gov2013-27.pdf.
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concluded, definitively, that Iran has made a prohibited device. Yet,
suspicion that Iran is headed in that direction is deep and held in key
capitals.17
What would be the consequence of an “Iranian breakout,” to
use the jargon of the nuclear nonproliferation business? Clearly, such
action would wound the Treaty deeply. Many states that were reticent
to agree to its indefinite extension would conclude that they had
made a mistake. It is not clear that such events would bring the
Treaty down entirely, but it is clear that if Iran did actually make a
nuclear explosive device, a regional nuclear arms race would ensue. In
that case, the NPT might become a dead letter.
Further, a regional nuclear arms race would greatly elevate the
prospect of regional war in the Middle East. This, in turn, could
involve states outside the region. I’m referring, of course, to an Israeli
or Israeli/U.S. attack upon Iran on the eve of Iran acquiring nuclear
weapons capability—when a so-called red line18 set by Israel and/or
the U.S. has been crossed. Where such events would lead is
incalculable but assumed to be of a massive order of magnitude.
I cannot resist pointing out to you the bitter irony, the
grotesque nature, of what elementally would be involved in such a
scenario: Israel, a non-party to the NPT but with clandestine nuclear
arms capability,19 attacking another state, presumably with the
17 See IAEA, Communication dated 4 March 2008 from the Governor for the
Russian Federation and the Resident Representatives of China, France, Germany, the United
Kingdom and the United States of America concerning U.N. Security Council resolution 1803
(2008),
IAEA
Doc.
INFCIRC/723
(Mar.
5,
2008),
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2008/infcirc723.pdf;
IAEA, Communication dated 12 March 2009 received from the Permanent Missions of China,
France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America regarding a
joint statement on Iran’s nuclear programme, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/749 (Apr. 1, 2009),
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2009/infcirc749.pdf.
18 See Arshad Mohammed, Key portions of Israeli PM Netanyahu’s U.N. speech
on Iran, REUTERS, Sept. 27, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/27/usun-assembly-israel-text-idUSBRE88Q1RR20120927; Michael Martinez, Netanyahu
asks U.N. to draw ‘red line’ on Iran’s nuclear plans, CNN.COM, Sept. 28, 2012,
http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/27/world/new-york-unga/index.html.
19 See IAEA, Israeli nuclear capabilities, Rep. of the Dir. Gen., IAEA Doc.
GOV/2010/49-GC(54)/14 (Sept. 3, 2010),
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support, if not the direct participation, of a state recognized by the
NPT as a nuclear-weapon state, in order to prevent the state under
attack from acquiring nuclear weapons—the very weapons the
belligerent states insist are essential to their national security. As
satirists sometimes remark when introducing an absurd or amazing
piece of human behavior, “you can’t make this stuff up!”
Flynt Leverett, in his most recent book and numerous other
writings, has raised important questions about the nature and future
of global governance—particularly in the context of the NPT and the
case of Iran.20 In my opinion, if developments of the kind I have just
described were to occur, and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
was to be seriously harmed, we would witness a significant
breakdown in the current system of global governance.
Why? Because the international community of states has said
for over 40 years now that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is the
“cornerstone” of nuclear arms control. The NPT has the most
member states of any treaty in existence, after the U.N. Charter and
Geneva Conventions.21 All but four states are parties to it, and this is

http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC54/GC54Documents/English/gc5414_en.pdf. See also James Conca, Israel Has Nuclear Weapons, But Only Iran Has
Nuclear Power, FORBES, Oct. 21, 2012,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2012/10/21/does-anyone-care-aboutirans-nuclear-energy-program/.
20 See generally FLYNT LEVERETT & HILLARY MANN LEVERETT, GOING
TO TEHRAN: WHY THE UNITED STATES MUST COME TO TERMS WITH THE ISLAMIC
REPUBLIC OF IRAN (2013). See also Flynt Leverett & Hillary Mann Leverett,
America’s Iran Policy and the Undermining of International Order, WORLD FIN. REV., JulyAug.
2013,
at
38-42,
http://law.psu.edu/_file/TWFR%20JulAug%202013America%20Iran-v2.pdf.
21 See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Status of the
Treaty, U.N. OFF. FOR DISARMAMENT AFF.,
http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt (last visited Sept. 17, 2013) (listing 190
states party to the NPT); Growth in United Nations membership, 1945-present,
U.N., http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml (last visited Sept. 17, 2013)
(listing 193 U.N. member states); Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS,
http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_NORM
StatesParties&xp_treatySelected=380 (last visited Sept. 17, 2013) (listing 195 states
party to the Geneva Convention).
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testimony to the profound importance of the matters it covers. 22
The NPT has within it a key element of global governance—a system
of reporting by the IAEA Board of Governors and ultimate
enforcement by the Security Council. If the Treaty’s protocol is
discarded, a systemic breakdown in global governance will have
occurred.
Among the changes that such a breakdown could author is
the disappearance of the notion of a commitment, held by both the
nuclear haves and have-nots, to a world without nuclear weapons.
Secondly, permanent membership of the Security Council
would have to be reconsidered. I have discussed reform of the
Security Council in another issue of this journal.23 Possibly a disaster
centered on Iran might prove to be the train wreck that would
produce this change in global governance that is so widely regarded
as seriously overdue. But I think it would be a costly and highly
dangerous way to bring about historical change.
Finally, the reference made at this symposium to the realist
school of thought needs a response.24 That school, led by many late
and great scholars and today by scholars such as John Mearsheimer, 25
At the time of publication, India, Pakistan, Israel, and the newly
formed Republic of South Sudan were not parties to the NPT.
23 See Richard Butler AC, Reform of the United Nations Security Council, 1
PENN. ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 23 (2012),
http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/jlia/vol1/iss1/2.
24 This is referring to a response to a question from the audience at the
February 15, 2013 symposium of the Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs,
available at http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/jlia/.
25 See JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, WHY LEADERS LIE: THE TRUTH ABOUT
LYING IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (2011); JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER & STEPHEN
M. WALT, THE ISRAEL LOBBY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (2007); JOHN J.
MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS (2001); JOHN J.
MEARSHEIMER, CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE (1983); John J. Mearsheimer,
Structural Realism, in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES: DISCIPLINE AND
DIVERSITY 77 (Tim Dunne et al. eds., 3d ed. 2013); John J. Mearsheimer, The Future
of Palestine: Righteous Jews vs. the New Afrikaners, in AFTER ZIONISM: ONE STATE FOR
ISRAEL AND PALESTINE 135 (Antony Loewenstein & Ahmed Moor, eds., 2012),
http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/PalestineFuture.pdf; John J. Mearsheimer,
Realists as Idealists, 20 SEC. STUD. 424 (2011),
22
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claims to see the world with crystal clear eyes and to make utterly
realistic, logical, scientific calculations.
If I were a realist being asked for advice on Iran, the NPT,
and future global governance, I think I would say to those in
Washington: Would you please stop making statements on the
alleged basis of realism that you cannot fulfill? Preventing Iran by
whatever means necessary from becoming a nuclear-weapon state
cannot be done. If Iran is determined to go nuclear, it will succeed.
Stop making statements on which you cannot deliver. Making such
statements, on a realist basis, is extremely dangerous. If you attempt
to deliver your proclaimed objective by going to all-out war, you will
impose costs on your nations and your people that are simply
unbearable and far worse than the problem you’ve set out to solve.
The true realist and realistic approach is to work to convince
Iran that it should not proceed with a weapons program, but accept,
as a matter of realism, that this will require concessions by you, and,
in particular, you will need to demonstrate your earnestness with
respect to the NPT as the cornerstone to a greater degree than ever
before.
Last year, a deeply apposite critique of the operation of the
NPT was published. At its core, it alleged that the NPT had been
characterized by: “selective nonproliferation and ineffectual
abolition.”26 This is not what Treaty authors or subsequent partners
had in mind. True and realistic leadership of global governance would
work urgently to reverse this.

http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/Realists-Idealists.pdf.
26 See Campbell Craig & Jan Ruzicka, Who’s in, who’s out? Campbell Craig
and Jan Ruzicka on the nonproliferation complex, LONDON REV. OF BOOKS, Feb. 23,
2012, at 37, http://www.lrb.co.uk/v34/n04/campbell-craig/whos-in-whos-out.
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